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Roman Law as Wisdom: Justice and 
Truth, Honour and Disappointment in 
Franz Wieacker’s Ideas on Roman Law
Ville Erkkilä1
Introduction
Franz Wieacker’s Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit (1952) is a seminal legal–historical 
work on twentieth-century Europe from one of the greatest Romanists of our time. 
In this book Wieacker, with incomparable sophistication, knitted together his works 
and learning from preceding decades in order to illustrate not only the legal history 
of modern Europe but also the influence of Roman law in the Continent’s destiny. 
While preparing his magnum opus, Wieacker lived through the social and political 
upheaval of Germany: National Socialism, the Second World War and the ‘Point Zero’ 
of post-war German society. Thus, Privatrechtsgeschichte is the end result of a decades-
long interaction between the scholar, the tradition of Roman law and the disarray of 
social structures.
Wieacker’s tool for understanding and categorizing the social phenomena he 
personally experienced was always his ideas on Roman law. With the help of this 
idealized form of thinking he attempted to explain new ideological streams, the 
shifting relations between politics and justice, as well as concrete changes in his 
position as a lawyer, scholar and citizen. In this chapter, I will review Wieacker’s works 
as a means of making sense of the turbulent social reality of a scholar, not merely the 
jurisprudential context but also the feeling of social prestige and disappointment. In 
practice, my hermeneutical task is conducted via scrutinizing Wieacker’s relation to 
two other theorists of the twentieth century, namely Carl Schmitt and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. This chapter scrutinizes the meanings – on the one hand shifting and on the 
other hand enduring – that Wieacker attached to Roman law in the light of the social 
and historical circumstances which he faced as a lawyer, scholar and German citizen. 
Wieacker’s relation to the thoughts of Schmitt and Gadamer are examples of different 
usages of the idea of Roman law and of the connotations associated with it during the 
turbulent twentieth century.
Roman Law and the Idea of Europe
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Like most of the prominent twentieth-century scholars of Roman law, Wieacker 
witnessed at first hand the collapse of traditional German society. But unlike Fritz 
Pringsheim, David Daube and Fritz Schulz, he did not experience exile. On the contrary, 
he was able to stay in totalitarian Germany, publish works dealing with Roman law and 
concurrently even advance in his career. It is not accurate to categorize Wieacker as a 
supporter of National Socialism, but he had to, and he was willing to, reconcile with 
some of the ideological streams of the Third Reich. However, after the Second World 
War, it was Wieacker who became perhaps the most renowned proponent of the idea 
of a pure and shared European legal heritage founded on Roman law (Winkler 2014; 
Behrends 1995).
It is difficult to overstate the influence of Wieacker’s contribution to the discipline. 
Moreover, his works continue to have an effect in the fields of Continental legal 
history and legal hermeneutics. The shift in Wieacker’s intellectual context – from an 
acknowledged scientist in a fascist society to a leading voice in the post-war search 
for sustaining the premises of European justice – seems to necessitate a similar abrupt 
change in the perennial principles guiding the scholar’s research stance. In Wieacker’s 
case, however, no such transformation took place. From his 1937 inaugural lecture ‘Vom 
Römischen Juristen’ to the second edition of his magnum opus Privatrechtsgeschichte 
der Neuzeit in 1967, his personal view on the essence of the fundamental virtues of 
liberty, communality and social justice did not really alter. Moreover, he never ceased 
to emphasize that within the European legal tradition these virtues were a reflection of 
the historical paragon of ‘true Roman jurisprudence’.2
To Wieacker, Roman law in its purest form was an embodiment and expression 
of a superior model of thinking which had surfaced in the later Roman Republic. He 
perceived the jurisprudence of the later Republic as a result of a historically exceptional 
interplay between socially originated virtues and legal craftsmanship which produced 
authoritative, just norms for society. The legal reasoning of Rome’s ‘great jurists’ 
managed to combine the collective ‘experience’ of jurists to their ‘social reality’ in 
an incomparable way (Wieacker 1939). In his legal–historical works he then further 
applied this principle of an ideal mode of thinking to the changing circumstances within 
the European continent, often dealing with questions of truthful legal interpretation 
and social justice.
The intellectual core in Wieacker’s scholarship – belief in the organic constitution 
of society and distinguished position of legal scholars within societies – was not only 
concise but also easy to combine with various theoretical openings in the field of legal 
science (Wolff 2007). Wieacker did adjust this belief in congruence with contemporary 
social change and theoretical streams in legal disciplines. Thus, even if the core 
remained unchangeable, the sentiments, meaning and contemporary relevance, which 
Wieacker attached to ‘true Roman jurisprudence’ in his works, varied over time. 
Depending on his intellectual context, the audience and the political atmosphere, 
Wieacker presented the wisdom of Roman law either as an ultimate communal form 
to reach a socially sustainable and legally binding decision, or as a paragon for a style 
of thinking in achieving truth, or as a mental asset which uplifted those who expressed 
it to social prominence, or as a virtuous orientation which modern legal science had 
failed to follow.
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Thus, during the years from the 1930s to the late 1960s there was no paradigmatic 
rupture in Wieacker’s idea of Roman law. While emphasizing different aspects from 
the ‘true great jurisprudence’ of the late Roman Republic he was always able to present 
Roman law as significant in relation to actual and contemporary political and juridical 
issues, notwithstanding that the political constitution of German society changed 
between absolute polarities. Nor was this approach opportunism; rather, Wieacker 
sincerely believed in the superior rationality of legal thinking cultivated by Roman law 
which, to him, never became outdated as an administrative tool in the modern search 
for social justice.
Interest on the themes of ‘social justice’ and ‘objective truth’ connected Wieacker’s 
works to the theories of Schmitt and Gadamer. Wieacker reflected and sharpened 
his view on the European legal past in relation to their works and borrowed to some 
extent from both of them, thus constructing his ‘way’ on principles which are often 
connected to Gadamer and Schmitt. In Wieacker’s personal history the attachment 
first to Schmitt’s work and then later to Gadamer’s manifests a shift in his intellectual 
context. Schmitt’s anti-parliamentarism and Gadamer’s dialogical hermeneutics 
presented two opposites in the politics of legal science. Schmitt contributed 
significantly to the ideological ‘battle’ of National Socialist Gleichschaltung and 
provided a ‘bourgeois façade’ for the fascists in their attempts to transform Germany 
into a totalitarian nation (Mehring 2014; Stolleis 2004). Although Schmitt was 
later turned down by the administrative and political elite of the NSDAP, he never 
abandoned his revolutionary conservatism or his offensive on democratic society. 
Gadamer, on the other hand, has been considered as a thoroughly apolitical 
figure, and was later even criticized for acquiescing in the consensus over social 
emancipation (Mendehlson 1979). While the collegiality between Wieacker and 
Schmitt was intense from the 1930s to 1945, Gadamer’s influence on Wieacker’s texts 
is most evident from the 1950s onwards.
Wieacker, Schmitt and Gadamer shared common social premises. As scholars in 
Weimar Germany, they perceived a fundamental change in social circumstances which 
obliged them to rethink the tradition of legal science. All of them were convinced of 
the incapability of contemporary or previously upheld models of argumentation to 
meet the needs of a rapidly changing community. Wieacker, Schmitt and Gadamer 
evaluated contemporary legal theories (and in particular positivistic theories) 
as incapable of depicting the essence of post-imperial society and in guiding 
jurisprudence in a ‘healthy’ direction. Along the lines of genuine historical change 
which they were experiencing as German scholars and citizens, they sought to 
re-evaluate the relationship between human sciences and social reality. They asserted 
that the extent to which European jurisprudence and politics was ready to accept and 
utilize the traditional, yet newly discovered, way of communal knowledge production 
would very much define the destiny and the moral essence of the Continent. So, 
neither the theoretical constructions of respected scholars nor Wieacker’s attachment 
first to Schmitt’s concepts and later to Gadamer’s thinking should be taken as a rootless 
play of ideas. The academic works of Schmitt, Gadamer and, in particular, Wieacker 
should be interpreted in relation to their context – the social disarray of Weimar and 
the consequent different phases of the social history of Germany.
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Carl Schmitt and Franz Wieacker: Honourable 
lawyers and justice as an institution
Wieacker’s acquaintance with Schmitt started in the early 1930s and lasted for a decade.3 
Schmitt’s writings and thoughts had a decisive effect on Wieacker’s vision of historical 
meaning and the structuring of modern (German) society, which is most evident in 
Wieacker’s earlier texts, and in a vaguer form even in his post-war works (Winkler 
2014). Many of Wieacker’s texts from the 1930s disclose a merger between ‘fashionable’ 
theoretical streams, contemporary jurisprudential and political need, on the one hand, 
and Wieacker’s legal scientific scholarship, on the other. Although originally a Roman 
law scholar, in the years following the National Socialist Machtergreifung (‘seizure of 
power’), Wieacker was commonly associated with the younger generation of legal 
scholars who, from a neo-Hegelian base, attempted to overcome the alleged – and 
factual – shortcomings of the then dominant positivist view of law (Meinel 2012).
In the early 1930s, Wieacker, like his peer group of young academics born in the 
first decade of the twentieth century, desperately pursued a permanent position as a 
professor, Ordinariat, in any decent German university with a law faculty. Wieacker 
and his generation comprehended the liberal Weimar social order as a perennial 
failure. Their scepticism was born in the collapse of the common German value 
system when the estates of Imperial Germany were replaced by inefficient Weimar 
parliamentarism, but was decisively strengthened through the social consequences 
of the 1923 hyperinflation and the looming threat of Bolshevik Revolution. In 1935, 
when Wieacker and Schmitt engaged for the first time in collegial correspondence, 
Wieacker was affiliated as a private docent with the University of Kiel and contributed 
to the teaching and writing of a loose group of young scholars known as the Kieler 
Schule (Winkler 2014). The Kieler Schule was not an insignificant institution in the 
legal scientific field, but occupied a distinguished place in the ‘legal renewal’ of the 
Third Reich. The Schule had been tasked by the new government with redefining legal 
education and the concepts of German legal science to meet the ideological standards 
of the fascist regime (Eckert 1992).
For this revolutionary conservative endeavour aligned with fascist interests, Schmitt 
was a convenient mentor. Thus, in their task the Schule, and Wieacker among others, 
leaned heavily on Schmitt’s theory of the institutional nature of proper jurisprudence 
and law. Nevertheless, even Schmitt’s contemporaries found it difficult to categorize his 
ideas. Depending on the interpreter, he appeared either as a consistent anti-positivist, 
revolutionary existentialist or as a political opportunist. In his 1930s works, Schmitt 
was concurrently socially conservative, intellectually provocative and explicitly racist. 
In 1935 Schmitt was at the height of his national career. He was widely cited, appreciated 
and referred to as Staatsrat or ‘state-counsellor’ (Mehring 2014). Although from his 
own perspective he was being ignored and sidelined in the bitter power struggles of 
German academia, to an outside observer he seemed to represent the epitome of a 
‘legal scientist of the Third Reich’.
In his works preceding the National Socialist Machtergreifung, Schmitt had 
attacked the hollowness of the positivist view on law and distinguished between the 
‘absolute’, legitimate, constitution and written statutes. As a ‘state-counsellor’ of the 
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Third Reich he pushed his interpretation even further and turned the enlightened 
idea of democratic legislation upside down. To Schmitt, parliamentarism was a later 
aberration of the pure expression of the will of the people (Schmitt 1996 [1932]). In 
his search for proper premises for an authoritative, just decision, Schmitt returned to 
groups or units distinguished by their shared set of values. He maintained that these 
communities usually upheld a practice of pursuing social justice, which furthermore 
was impossible to evaluate by means of (positivistic) legal theory (Shapiro 2008: 19–36). 
Consequently, on the level of legal culture, the law-giver should take into account those 
interpretations of norms and social orders within the societies it sought to regulate 
(Schmitt 2004 [1934]: 20). In the social reality of a people, questions of scientific truth 
and legal justice were to be resolved by analysing the existence of these traditions.
This ‘concrete-order thinking’, so prominent in 1930s German jurisprudence, was 
perfected by Schmitt in his Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens 
(1934). Schmitt asserted that the jurisprudential ‘concrete orders’, juridical traditions, 
in the end safeguarded the justness of entire legal systems. Here, by jurisprudential 
tradition Schmitt actually meant the level of responsibility, dignity and influence which 
lawyers as a group possessed in a given society. The higher status and greater political 
power of the jurist class correlated with the ‘justness’ of the community. In comparing 
the legal cultures of France, Great Britain and Germany, Schmitt attempted to show 
that each distinct legal community had its own tradition, which remained superior to 
any attempt at imposing outside legal doctrines on its traditional practice. To Schmitt 
the British legal tradition was closest to a system which secured the achievement of 
social justice within the level of the nation. Schmitt took the view that, in Britain, 
lawyers were the actual law makers. They were in charge of implementing social justice, 
which they did according to the interpretation of the norms abiding within their order 
(Schmitt 2004 [1934]; Schmitt 1995 [1941]). British jurisprudence was guided by 
‘jurisdictional authority, hierarchy of offices, inner autonomy, internal counterbalance 
of opposing forces and tendencies, inner discipline, honour and official secrets’. Thus, 
it embodied a perfect ‘example of concrete order thinking’ (Schmitt 2004 [1934]: 88).
The tradition of jurisprudence in Britain was a ‘concrete order’, which was able to 
evade the factual state of conflict characteristic of modern communities (cf. Schmitt 
1996 [1923]: 74–80). In the perspective of Schmitt’s vast output, the idea of material 
‘concrete orders’ was more or less a side effect. Indeed, he never used the concept again. 
It has also been noted that the concept in itself is more an example of outstanding 
rhetorical skill than a social-scientific breakthrough. Along with the rocketing status 
of Schmitt and enthusiastic deployment by his disciples, the concept quickly became a 
mere fashionable slogan, which was used to describe pretty much everything (Mehring 
2014). Soon the actual explanatory value of the phrase was being exploited.
However, the 1934 book, and the concept within it, was crucial in that it shaped 
the presuppositions and ontological stances of a whole generation of young scholars, 
among them Wieacker, who – like so many legal scientists of his generation – was 
assured by Schmitt’s revolutionary conservatism and fascinated by his aggressive yet 
sophisticated style of writing (Rüthers 2012: 99–101, 270–317; Müller 2003: 1–4; Meinel 
2012: 36–47). Schmitt’s untiring attack on the alleged incongruity between (positivist) 
legal science and social reality was, in its conservatism, an orientation which fitted 
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very well with Wieacker’s perspective of German society. As a textbook representative 
of the bourgeois values of German Bildungsbu﻿̈rgertum, Wieacker witnessed at first 
hand the inability of modern society to maintain circumstances which it promised 
in its democratic ethos and interpreted this as a failure in the value-base of the legal 
system. As a young scholar, Wieacker experienced personally the obvious incoherence 
between the social reality of Weimar and dogmatic legal science.4
The experience of the distance between national values and law was a feature which 
provided common ground for young, conservative legal scholars in their attempts to 
textually contribute to and influence the National Socialist ‘revolution’.5 It has to be 
acknowledged that during the Gleichschaltung of German society, the NSDAP assigned 
to these young scholars the task of translating legal language to coincide with National 
Socialist ideology, while the young scholars perceived themselves as the vanguard 
and elite of the ‘new stance’ in legal science. Nevertheless, their pursuit of resolving 
the incongruence between law and reality – providing legal bases for social justice 
– was sincere. From the basis of their Weimar experience, the members of the Kieler 
Schule were convinced of the necessity for their ‘legal renewal’. So, like Ernst Rudolf 
Huber and Ernst Forsthoff, Wieacker – leaning heavily on Schmitt’s theories – outlined 
‘new’ jurisprudence which would meet the consciousness of the German people (See 
Forsthoff 1933; Wolf 1934; Huber 1935). What distinguished Wieacker’s contributions 
from most contemporary texts is the absence of racist rhetoric and a persistent 
adherence to antique (Roman) examples in legal–historical comparison.
Judging by their correspondence, it is clear that Wieacker appreciated Schmitt and 
sought his favour. There were, however, significant disagreements between them, of 
which the perception of the meaning given to Roman law might have been the most 
crucial. Schmitt was a vehement opponent of Roman law.6 He saw Roman law as an 
arbitrary theoretical construction, which during its reception in Europe disturbed 
and overruled the natural, sacred and organic legal systems or orders of the Germanic 
kingdoms. To Schmitt, applied Roman law became a symptom of the process of 
‘scientification’, where the traditional relation between the people and power had been 
misplaced. Needless to say, this point by Schmitt was backed up by the Nazi party, 
who as early as their party programme of 1919 had expressed their revulsion towards 
‘foreign’ Roman law.
Wieacker, however, as a Romanist first and foremost, sought to prove that Roman 
law was not a hostile intruder but a tradition which had been ‘Germanized’ over the 
centuries, and thus its study was to analyse the foundations of the national legal system 
(Wieacker 1967: 8–24). The biggest practical obstacle blocking an agreement between 
Wieacker and Schmitt was the ‘reputation’ of Roman law. The nineteenth-century 
Pandectists had emphasized the dogmatic and hierarchical aspect within Roman 
law, which became a synonym for a stiff understanding and idea of jurisprudence, 
compressing the law as a collection of norms, unable to adapt to changing social 
reality. This picture was the precise target of Schmitt’s attack; he defended law’s dignity, 
tradition and sacredness against ‘over-theoretical’ constructions (Ojakangas 2009: 
34–54). Wieacker was well aware of all this; thus his aim was to prove that Roman law 
was not an unnatural construction but actually in itself a concrete order. In his letter to 
Schmitt in 1935 Wieacker argued7 that the alleged influence of Greek theories (which 
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was supposedly the reason for Roman law becoming distinct from social reality), far 
from being the defining essence, was an external, late and misleading trait in the entity 
of Roman law:
[Greek systematization] produces a legal theory from a Greek model for the 
relationship of natural and civil law that is rather subordinate to classical Roman 
law. It leads on the other hand to a rationally and logically arranged survey of 
legal concepts that have been handed down, as they are self-evident to the Greek-
educated Roman, and thereby make the somewhat archaic guild-like thinking 
style of the pre-classical lawyers (comparable to the English Inns of Court) 
much more interesting. In comparison, I think that the inner structure of the 
classic jurisprudence almost completely refused to give itself to these influences, 
and it maintained the ancient Roman style up to Julian’s former revision of the 
Roman edicts.8
Wieacker described Roman law as being composed of living, organic edicts which 
resisted any attempts at theorization. On the contrary, as an entity it could be better 
described through its ‘inner feeling’. Moreover, it was held together by the guild-like 
community of the late Republican lawyers, and their distinguished style of seeing the 
world. In his letter Wieacker drew a straight analogy between Roman lawyers as a class 
and the English Inns of Court. As presented above, to Schmitt these Inns of Court 
were the clearest example of a juridical concrete order. Wieacker likewise held that the 
relative social status which lawyers allegedly possessed in the Roman Republic, as an 
exclusive and coherent social unit, was both the result of and the key to their success 
in Roman culture. On the other hand, the evident failure of contemporary modern 
legal systems, in terms of their ability to connect the language of law to the ‘life’ of the 
people, was not a Roman trait. On the contrary, Roman law was an insurmountable 
example of the ‘facts that have a real and independent existence in the legal world’, and 
the Pandectists’ failure was a result of later Greek corruption.9
In 1939 Wieacker elaborated this idea on the inner ‘spirit’ of the Roman lawyer 
class in his article ‘Vom Römischen Juristen’, where he described Roman culture as 
a seedbed for European legal ideas. It was lawyers who had cultivated the Roman 
mentality towards rational problem-solving and the idea of social justice, opposing 
and substituting the previous superstitious and violent worldview of pre-modern 
generations. The lawyers of the later Republic invented and practised the law as 
casuistic mind-setting, through which they were able to apply their internalized body 
of knowledge in different situations in order to reach a just result (Wieacker 1939: 
440, 445, 448). Their achievement was not due to mere academic dogmatism. To 
Wieacker, Roman law was not based on a theoretical or conceptual construction but 
on a phronesis, a skill. This lawyering skill was a synthesis of lawyers’ education and 
social status.10 Even in ancient Rome, the intellectuals in general were usually capable 
of deciding and ruling according to their accumulated knowledge, a tradition which 
was a prerequisite provided by their Hellenistic education. But lawyers, in distinction 
from other educated, upper-class people, had the social, communal knowledge which 
enabled them to understand the meaning of justice in different circumstances. This 
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knowledge, which Wieacker later labelled as Lebenskunde (‘science of life’), was a 
compilation of virtues, acquired first hand from their noble way of life. They served, 
experienced, and lived the law.
Through military service and political speeches he [the Roman lawyer] is of the 
highest virtue, a legitimated public agent.… [He conducts] free service for the 
community that is exercised through expert opinion and instruction and of which 
the strictest guarantee is the predominant lack of fees. Just this distinguishes the 
‘honos’ from the highest professions, especially the literate ones, even legally 
trained court speakers, who he looks down on with the cold contempt of the 
real expert.11
Thus the European legal tradition, descending from Rome, was based on the experience 
of law and on law (Wieacker 1939: 455–7; Avenarius 2010). But more than a knowledge 
of statutes, examples or texts, this knowledge, this experience, was based on a sense 
of virtuous social being appearing within a class of people. A true European legal 
tradition embedded the authority of both the law and lawyers.
Why, then, was Wieacker ready to accept Schmitt’s polemic, and aggressive, 
approach to jurisprudence and why did he employ Schmitt’s conceptualizations in 
his texts? Wieacker’s 1930s works loyally repeated the ‘fighting stance’ towards the 
liberal order, but no signs of racist infiltration are evident in his methodology, while 
the obligatory references to the Führer are few and notably perfunctory. Nevertheless, 
Wieacker did agree with Schmitt that something was not right in the contemporary 
legal system in Germany. Judges did not have the power or the ability to decide 
according to the meaning of the law. They were content or obliged merely to follow 
norms but not to develop or interpret the law in a given case. Contemporary German 
jurisprudence lacked an acknowledgement of the traditional mindset of a lawyer, 
which had originated from the experience of the law. There was no space for phronesis 
in the mentality which now prevailed in German academia. In his letter to Schmitt 
of 1942, Wieacker agreed with the former’s thoughts on the complete inability of the 
German legal system to meet the needs of the new world and to teach lawyers capable 
of securing the moral core of society.
However one wonders if, in each German systematic-philosophical structure, 
the pervasiveness of magistrates with the role, which the basic political order 
assigns to lawyers, has not failed until now, due in fact to each systematic teaching 
approach. It is conceded that the systematic-normative approach of life is, for 
better or worse, characteristic of the Germans in their lives and deeds, as well as 
for government policy.12
It is important to notice that neither Schmitt nor Wieacker meant National Socialism 
when they wrote about the crisis in the legal system. Both placed the starting point 
of the crisis to times well before the Nazis and complained about the ongoing crisis 
long after 1945 (Wieacker 1967: 482). To them, the German system produced lawyers 
unable to work as a political ‘estate’ because of the systemic-philosophical ideology 
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which had nullified the space for individual interpretation and consideration. Wieacker 
and Schmitt agreed that educating young law students was the most important task 
in reviving German legal science and the status of lawyers along with it.13 What the 
legal system needed was prestige, education and restoration of the priority of practical 
legal thinking.
Furthermore, in the 1940s Wieacker continued defining his idea of the spiritual 
heritage of Roman law in European legal history as appearing in the ‘estates’ of lawyers. 
In his article ‘Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein’ (1944) 
Wieacker defended Roman law from the accusations of Germanistic legal scholars (not 
far from Schmitt) who blamed it as originally constituting the rift between the people’s 
everyday reality and the legal system. Wieacker sought to prove that Roman law was 
not responsible for this twist of the modern world, but rather that, without Roman 
law and lawyers trained in Roman law, this distortion would have been far worse. He 
argued that the ethical sustainability of a particular judgement, happening in the reality 
framed by a collection of norms, depended on whether the given judge had applied 
Rechtsgewissen (‘legal conscience’) in weighing that particular case (Wieacker 1944: 
42).14 According to Wieacker, German lawyers were able to cultivate Rechtsgewissen 
ever since they obtained training in Roman law. This was a skill which enabled them 
to interpret existing norms and execute decisions, concurrently maintaining and 
cultivating righteousness in the reality of society. Again, Rechtsgewissen was not just 
about formal education. Wieacker asserts that whether an individual was further 
capable of using this mental tool depended on their personal moral stance and 
adjustment to the ‘guild’ of lawyers (Wieacker 1944: 24, 31–2, 41). A disinclination 
or inability to subordinate one’s legal act to the virtues of the class resulted in bad 
decisions, injustice and oppressive laws. On the other hand, following, learning and 
contributing to the tradition stemming from Roman law not only provided ethically 
sustainable judgements but also cultivated the European legal heritage (Wieacker 
1944: 28, 41).
Hans-Georg Gadamer and Franz Wieacker: 
The hermeneutics of truth
From our perspective it is easy to argue that the assumption of power by the NSDAP 
and the resulting construction of a totalitarian nation after 1933 was in principle 
misunderstood by many legal scholars. Undoubtedly, the vast majority of academics 
concentrated on the abolition of the loathed Weimar Republic, welcomed social 
conservatism – which the new order appeared to bring about – and were delighted by 
the career possibilities which the expulsion of Jewish university staff offered for young 
scholars. Like Wieacker, many of the ‘Aryan’ scholars could not predict or accept the 
totalitarian reality into which the NSDAP turned German society. Their miscalculation 
is in one sense understandable, since not even legal scientists can foresee the future. At 
the same time, the general incapability to read and later to cope with the ‘aberration 
of social justice’ does tell us something about the then prevailing scholarly culture of 
legal science.
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If one leaves aside anti-Semitism and appreciation of militant fascism – which were 
true and widespread motivators for some legal scientists – many, like Wieacker, sincerely 
believed that the new order would accept the lawyer-estate as its administrative trustee, 
and the ‘guild’ of legal scholars would in practice steer the moral consciousness of 
the nation. When the true nature of the fascist regime reached legal academia, many 
resorted to a form of apologetic existentialism.
Disappointed by National Socialism, scholars like Ernst Forsthoff and Schmitt 
in their writings of the early 1940s concentrated on the ‘pure core’ of legal science – 
unchanged premises, which would enable scholars to interpret and develop law 
according to tradition, national culture and ideals of social justice (Meinel 2012). 
These scholars tried deliberately to put aside their previous alliance with fascism  – 
which at a rhetorical level had been presented as an attempt to revive an age-old 
idea of national ‘social justice’ – and instead turned their attention to the dilemma of 
‘objective truth’. Many legal scientists, Wieacker among them, focused on ‘conscience’ 
(see, for example, Welzel 1947).15 This was a concept which, when employed in legal–
historical and criminal law study, enabled a metaphysical and existentialist approach 
to jurisprudential questions.
In all of these approaches scholars reluctantly and indirectly concurred that the 
‘legal awareness of the people’, on which scholars had built their 1930s explorations, was 
apparently indiscernible and an insufficient starting point for legal scientific research. 
Instead, academics started to distinguish their pure, ‘conscientious’ scholarship from 
the irrational political sphere and the oblivious will of the people. The ‘people’ was 
no more a source of inspiration and appeared as the opposite to scholarly views and 
thinking. Proper, scholarly wisdom was able to read the signs and circumstances of its 
time and analyse contemporary reality. ‘Truth’ was not with the people, but it could be 
extracted from the people by means of learned legal skill. Wieacker wrote to Gadamer 
in early 1945 in describing the people of Germany and Italy:
The condition of the public of this country is so abominable. These people, without 
soul, without conscience and destiny in the good and the bad, without humour in 
the proper meaning of the word, without sentimentality, and without the need to 
see a new reality that is only visibly transcendent of their own souls behind their 
own reality – these people are peculiarly a comforting and exhilarating form, and 
also likeable in the everyday world. To understand the judgement ‘here without 
conscience’, I must use these words: instead of the soul, a bright cheerfulness, 
instead of responsibility, absolution, instead of the conscience, the law, instead of 
destiny, grace.16
The fact that Wieacker sent to Gadamer this letter – written in the front line in 
northern Italy – in which he expressed his disappointment with the idealized ‘people’, 
is in many ways revealing. During the last year of the Second World War, Wieacker 
was deeply tired of and cynical towards any nationalistic rhetoric. To Gadamer, such 
language had always appeared hollow, and in his philosophy he searched for historical 
meaning outside political history, national communities and ethnic distinctions. Not 
even Gadamer was uninfluenced by public opinion and the social reality of totalitarian 
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Germany, but he seemed to remain uninterested in the politics of human sciences. 
Indeed, the influence of National Socialism in his works is either non-existent or very 
well camouflaged (Hausmann 2008; Grondin 2003). As a student of Martin Heidegger, 
Gadamer’s thoughts on history, philosophy, philology and law reflected the ideas of 
his teacher. Additionally, he further developed and fine-tuned Heidegger’s theses on 
metaphysics to a universal science of interpretation and hermeneutics. During the 
Second World War Gadamer worked at the University of Leipzig, where Wieacker held 
the professorship in Roman law (Grondin 2003). This era marked the beginning of their 
friendship and connection which continued throughout the century. In Gadamer’s 
massive output, the questions of legal application and historical interpretation link him 
to the theme of this compilation, which he frequently discussed with Wieacker in their 
correspondence (Avenarius 2013).
The ‘Point Zero’ of 1945 shook the foundations of German legal science. Due to 
the enormous influence of Martin Heidegger, the existentialist orientation in German 
legal science was already a significant stream in the 1930s, but war and disappointment 
had drawn increasing attention towards the ontological sides of law. So Gadamer’s 
theory of truthful interpretation was a current reality for many legal scientists during 
the later war years. Nevertheless, the end of the Second World War meant that legal 
scientists had to redefine the ‘existence’ of, and provide justification for, their own 
scholarship and discipline. The de-Nazification of German universities put legal 
scholars into an unprecedented situation. Suddenly, they were accused of enabling the 
crimes of the Nazis. The academics reacted with denial and felt offended. Surely their 
project had nothing to do with politics. With growing determination, they struggled 
to prove that the legal havoc of the 1930s was a result of theoretical dogmatism, not 
academic opportunism. Legal positivism was to be blamed for the misreading and 
mal-development of law. With its ‘cold’ and ‘heartless’ approach, it had perverted the 
meaning of law (Foljanty 2013). The search for that ‘meaning’, of sustaining premises for 
just legal interpretation, became the purpose of legal science in the decades following 
the ‘Point Zero’ of 1945. However, this task had actually already started earlier, during 
the later years of the Second World War.
Similarly to Wieacker’s work, there is no war-related, clear rupture in Gadamer’s 
methodological approach before and after the Second World War. In Gadamer’s 
understanding, a similar understanding of a particular source or historical 
phenomenon was always historically situated and affected by the prejudices of each 
interpreter. Gadamer based his theory of understanding on the preceding tradition 
of hermeneutics and historians. This meant that he also saw the interpretative work 
of a scholar taking shape in a hermeneutical circle where a particular event has to be 
understood as a part of, and deriving from, a larger entity. But unlike Schleiermacher 
or Willem Droysen, he emphasized the role of the interpreter’s culture (Gadamer 2000; 
Froeyman 2014). A scholar always approaches a research question from a distinct 
worldview or perspective. Thus their understanding of a phenomenon in a past 
culture or alien language is determined by certain prejudices, which Gadamer named 
‘preconception’ (Vorurteil). The prejudices of a given scholar are consequently shaped 
by the historical situation of its culture (Gadamer 2000: 277–84). Our understanding of 
the world, history and human activity is irreversibly bound to the history of long-term 
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effects, Wirkungsgeschichte, of their surroundings and culture. By this Gadamer did not 
solely mean specific social or political changes in the past of a particular community, 
but meaningful effects extending to the realms of understanding and interpretation 
(Gadamer 1986a: 115–17; Gadamer 2000: 297).
To Gadamer, humanist research was a dialogical task. He asserted that although 
scholars were always bound to their historical situation, their horizon was not fixed. 
This horizon could and should evolve and change along with the research process. 
Questions one poses as to the subject matter produce answers that speak of or appeal 
to the scholar. In turn, this produces more questions as to the phenomena or text under 
scrutiny (Gadamer 1986b: 57–65). For example, the research process in studying 
Roman law should take a form of a dialogue. This dialogue would incorporate the 
tradition – thus Roman law as events and interpretation – and the historical situation 
of the scholar. What clearly distinguished Gadamer from scholars like Emilio Betti and 
Wieacker, however, was his rejection of a complete and correct understanding (Betti 
1962). An interpretative act could never reach the final meaning of a particular event 
or text. To him, the search for ‘objective truth’ was futile. A historical distance from 
the phenomenon one was analysing was in practice helpful, since time has a tendency 
to fade certain irrelevant opinions about a historical event. Nevertheless, the process 
of interpreting and reinterpreting history was a never-ending business. An objective 
truth about a distinct meaning or event was a ‘phantom’ that scholars kept on chasing 
(Gadamer 1986b: 65; Veith 2015: 119–22). Consequently there was no method that 
could lead a scholar to an ‘absolutely correct’ interpretation of history, or indeed law 
either (Gadamer 1986a: 107–10).17 A lawyer or historian might reach an agreement 
between their heritage and a tradition whose understanding they pursued, but 
nonetheless all attempts at understanding were bound to the dialogical and incomplete 
process of truth-seeking.
After the war, Wieacker continued his involvement in the theme of the rightful 
application of law and frequently discussed Gadamer’s ideas in his academic texts.18 
The correspondence between the two stayed irregular but continued. In a scholarly 
sense, Gadamer’s phenomenal contribution to the post-war discussion on legal 
hermeneutics was naturally a reason in itself for Wieacker to take an interest in the 
former’s ideas, but at the same time Gadamer’s writings converged in an important 
way with some of Wieacker’s arguments. Wieacker stuck to his ‘existential’ – originally 
‘Schmittian’ – approach to law. In the end, and for Wieacker, law was the embodiment 
of the questions people presented to their being. In law, the achievements, as well as the 
limits of human understanding, became visible. Legal history was a tool to compare 
and understand different views and ways of thinking, not only in the legal sphere but 
also within the wider spectrum of different cultures.
In the first edition of Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit in 1952, Wieacker 
proposed that the task of the legal historian should be to track ‘time-transcending 
legal ideas’ (u﻿̈berzeitliche Rechtsidee), from the European past (Wieacker 1952:  8). 
Although he removed that conceptualization from the second, 1967 edition of 
Privatrechtsgeschichte, the tone even in the second edition of the classic book remained 
the same; every historical situation was unique and could not be reproduced in our 
present, but there resided a historical paragon of legal thinking that could serve as 
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a model for modern legal science. That ‘time-transcending model’ was naturally the 
‘great jurisprudence’ of late Republican Rome. To Wieacker, the true brilliance of 
classical Roman lawyers was in the way they adjusted their knowledge to changing 
circumstances through method. In the end it was about interpreting the tradition in a 
new situation. It enabled Roman lawyers be in touch with reality, while concurrently 
conducting a just and correct interpretation (Wieacker 1939; Wieacker 1956). This 
congruence between thinking and reality was desirable, not sophistication in legal 
expression or universality of legal definition, as some Roman law scholars explained 
the continuing importance of Roman jurisprudence to modern legal science. Thus, 
to Wieacker, Roman legal sources presented a paragon for European legal cultures in 
the sense that they were a (pale) reflection of the superior legal skill and wisdom of 
Roman law.19
Gadamer’s idea of a universally incomplete understanding not only diminished 
the value of classical Roman lawyers but also cast a shadow over Wieacker’s whole 
reconstruction of European legal history. The problem concerned in particular 
Gadamer’s idea of ‘preconception’ (Avenarius 2010). To Wieacker, the problem of 
interpretation in a particular legal case concerned the appropriateness or solidity of 
the methods deployed; a truthful judgement could be achieved only through certain, 
correct methods. The question of methodology also extended beyond jurisdiction and 
to the morality of legal science (Wieacker 1967). According to Wieacker, the post-war 
‘crisis of justice’ was partly due to an incorrect interpretation of the law, that is, legal 
science (more precisely, legal positivism) had become disoriented in its methods. He 
wrote to Gadamer in 1965:
This [crisis] could be related to the generally accepted discrediting and 
“unmasking” conducted by legal positivism. These things [methodology] are now 
in such disarray that the old fundamental relations between law and dogma are at 
the moment nothing but blurred.20
In Privatrechtsgeschichte Wieacker continued to study the form of legal wisdom which 
would enable just decisions despite historical and social confusion. With unprecedented 
explicitness he called this skill Rechtsgewissen. In comparison to his wartime writings, 
Wieacker linked Rechtsgewissen more closely to the long line of European legal tradition 
and to correct jurisprudential methods, but nevertheless it was the inner instinct of 
the judge that enabled him to accomplish a sound interpretation of the law and let 
justice happen. So in Wieacker’s theory there was a connection between feeling and 
interpretation, and to be more precise, a just understanding could not be achieved 
by means of pure reason (Wieacker 1967: 619). Justice involved such sentiments as 
respect, modesty and dignity. Again, Wieacker wrote about the post-war ‘crisis of 
justice’ to Gadamer:
Modern law does not seem to give such an experience [of prestigious relation 
to tradition] for today’s lawyers. I cannot think of any other reason for this very 
peculiar phenomenon than particular disrespect on behalf of contemporary 
theories of interpretation against the authority of the word of law.21
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Partly this idea of just, truthful interpretation was difficult to translate to Gadamer’s 
hermeneutical model. To Gadamer, true interpretation existed in dialogue. When 
scholars engaged in discussion or reading, the quest for understanding was a dialectic 
one. A change occurred, in terms of both the understanding of the phenomenon 
involved and the scholar’s own prejudices. The whole core of Wieacker’s historical view 
was that a model of just interpretation had existed in the history of Europe and should 
also be used as such in contemporary society in order to correct ‘the crisis of justice’ 
(Wieacker 1967).
In the end the disagreement between Wieacker and Gadamer was about the 
nature of historical time. Gadamer was ready to abandon historical knowledge as 
‘beyond-temporal’; it had no pre-given direction. Written history was a series of acts 
of interpretation where people tried to understand their past and present. For sure 
there were some consistent elements in human beings that had remained unchanged 
through time, but in his view historical narrative was more about the present than 
the past. Wieacker’s idea about history was, as Reinhard Zimmermann rightly asserts, 
distinctively constructive in its nature (Zimmermann 1995). Rather than identifying 
the possible divergent lines of development in European legal history, Wieacker 
emphasized the unity and similar features of different legal cultures distinguished by 
time and place.
In all his post-war works, Wieacker tried to re-establish something that the 
modernization process had broken or questioned. The majority of Wieacker’s 1950s 
and 1960s works dealt with the rational mind of Europe and Europeans. History was 
an ‘onward march’ of rationality, and legal history worked as an ‘iron ratio’ which 
conserved the wisdom of past generations (Wieacker 1967: 619–25). The task for the 
modern legal historian was to find the appropriate sources, understand them correctly 
and then apply this wisdom to their present society. To Wieacker, this triumph of 
the will and reason was a fact in European history, which renewed itself in countless 
conditions and environments through history. The methodological superiority of the 
Roman lawyers over a superstitious and magical worldview was the first and most 
evident example of this historical direction.22
Why, then, did Wieacker pay such strong attention to Gadamer’s thoughts, which 
rejected the existence of any particular ‘correct’ methodology in distinguishing a 
‘proper understanding’ of legal history? To Wieacker, who consistently opposed any 
Gadamerian hesitation as to the possibilities of legal science to reach the ultimate truth 
about history and society, Gadamer’s theory nevertheless offered support in his attack 
on the genuine nemesis: legal positivism (Betti 1962: 52). Gadamer emphasized the 
practical wisdom of adjusting and interpreting the law in differing historical situations 
as a means of achieving a solid interpretation. This wisdom was embedded in the idea of 
‘sensus communis’. This meant that a group of properly informed, learned people could 
reach a consensus, which could serve as a truthful and just decision in a particular 
situation. If the community of scholars was able to apply their common ‘tact’ and 
knowledge in a dialogical enquiry, their jurisprudence was in congruence with reality 
and truth. To Gadamer, the dialogical research process and decision-making should be 
directed by virtues, which were neither impulses nor calculations. ‘Sensus communis’ 
was close to conscience or ethos. Furthermore, in elaborating this ‘sensus communis’, 
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Gadamer used examples from the Stoic philosophers and Wieacker’s presentation of 
the Roman world and ‘conscience’ of the guild of lawyers. Wieacker’s Rechtsgewissen, 
practical legal wisdom and Gadamer’s ‘common sense’ were different elaborations of 
the same phenomenon – legal wisdom – but to Wieacker, it was always associated with 
Roman law, and more precisely with the common knowledge and mentality of the 
guild of Roman lawyers.
The multifaceted idea of Roman law in 
Franz Wieacker’s academic texts
Different phases, multiple interpretations and a continuous attempt to bridge the 
domains of social reality and jurisprudence all appear in Wieacker’s idea of Roman law. 
His view on late Republican jurisprudence was never complete, and he did not cease 
to compare and connect that idea to contemporary social events and new theoretical 
openings in legal science. The idea of Roman law offered a ‘fixed position’ from where 
he could observe and comment on historical change and legal scientific discourse. 
Likewise his engagement with the thoughts of Schmitt and Gadamer can be seen as 
different phases in his scholarly career. However, they are not hierarchical stages in 
a linear development of scholarly identity. Wieacker interpreted and re-interpreted 
Schmitt’s and Gadamer’s ideas, abandoned them and returned to them, whenever 
a changed social situation or paradigmatic change in legal science necessitated 
rethinking the core values of his scholarly principles. There was, however, such a 
core, which was both irreplaceable and irremovable. To Wieacker, the correct kind of 
jurisprudence was not only learned but also, and always, virtuous. What distinguished 
Roman law among other legal cultures and elevated it to wisdom was its strong relation 
and interdependence with the noble values of Roman society. Law should have been 
shaped by the feelings and qualities of dignity, piety, maturity and humility. Moreover, 
law should have been guarded and developed by a group of people who embodied 
those virtues. In Wieacker’s historical view, Roman law was nothing less than that, 
whereas modern law was barely related at all.
Although the theories of Wieacker, Schmitt and Gadamer diverged in many places, 
they converge in their aim to fight against the positivistic ideas of law and society. 
Schmitt, Wieacker and Gadamer attempted to defend the humanist tradition against 
Cartesian and inductionist theories in jurisprudence, social sciences and philosophy. 
They saw this humanist tradition in very different ways but found their adversaries 
in academics and streams of thought (imaginary or real) from the field of positivistic 
induction and pure reason. Likewise, according to these scholars, those guilty of 
inconsistency between reality and science included scholars who disembodied 
scientific reasoning from traditional values and virtues.
Accordingly, Wieacker saw the legal and social turmoil of the twentieth century 
deriving from an ontological incoherence in society, an incoherence which was also 
the constitutive factor behind the tragic political events of the modern era. Political 
and legal tragedies were a symptom of a deeper imbalance in social relations and 
awareness. Thus his ideas on legal science and justice were ‘resurrective’ in the sense 
Roman Law and idea of Europe.indb   215 10-10-2018   14:51:07
216  Roman Law and the Idea of Europe
that he believed that a simple misinterpretation of tradition had caused injustice in 
society. European legal tradition simply needed to be reminded again of its founding 
virtues in order to achieve social justice.
This construction of European legal history and legal–historical knowledge 
emphasized the meaning of law, further interpreted by legal scholars. Alongside this 
view, and contrary to the legal positivists, Wieacker maintained that, while interpreting 
the law, lawyers simultaneously created it and that their process of creation should be 
conducted unattached (and superior) to the political sphere. This view of European 
legal tradition put lawyers and legal scientists as the subjects, the makers, of not only 
law but history as well. At the same time, it emphasized the role of legal historians. 
Since European legal history was based and built on the experience, knowledge and 
interpretative acts of lawyers, reliable information about one’s own legal reality could 
be obtained by comparing the legal experience of the present to that in the past.
Notes
1 This research has made been possible by the European Research Council under the 
European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC grant 
agreement n°313100 (Reinventing the Foundations of European Legal Culture 
1934–64).
2 Cf. Chapter 4 in this book.
3 Their relationship as colleagues may have started as early as 1933, but the first letter 
from Wieacker to Schmitt is from August 1935. See Franz Wieacker to Carl Schmitt 
on 13 July 1935, Nachlass Carl Schmitt, RW 265–17971/2, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Duisburg.
4 See Franz Wieacker’s letter to Erik Wolf on 18 April 1934, NL Erik Wolf 66/3044, 
Freiburg-Albert-Ludwig-Universitätsarchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau; also Wieacker 1936: 
74–80.
5 Here by the ‘network of young scholars’, including Franz Wieacker, I mean the 
members of Kieler Schule – and especially Ernst Rudolf Huber – Erik Wolf and Ernst 
Forsthoff. These scholars not only were close professionally but also remained friends 
way up to the late decades of the twentieth century (Winkler 2014; Meinel 2012). 
Their ‘orientation’ was firmly fascist but less party oriented (Ralf Walkenhaus 1997).
6 See Fritz Pringsheim’s open letter to Carl Schmitt (Pringsheim 1960: 532–8).
7 Wieacker to Carl Schmitt, 13 July 1935, Nachlass Carl Schmitt, RW 265–17971/2, 
Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg. The letter is more a review of Johannes 
Stroux’s article ‘Griechische Einflüsse auf die Entwicklung der römischen Rechtswis-
senschaft gegen Ende der republikanischen Zeit’ (1934) that Schmitt had sent to 
Wieacker. In the text, Stroux asserts that Greek philosophy, and in particular the Stoic 
parts of it, had a decisive influence on Roman legal thinking even during the time of 
the late Republic. Wieacker rejected this claim as fundamentally inaccurate.
8 Wieacker to Carl Schmitt, 13 July 1935, Nachlass Carl Schmitt, RW 265–17971/2, 
Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg: ‘dies System bringt einmal eine für das 
klassische römische Recht ziemlich untergebliche Rechtstheorie griechschen Musters 
über das Verhältnis von natürlichem und bürgereigenem Recht hervor. Sie führt auf 
der anderen Seite zu einer rationaleren und logisch durchgegliederten Erfassung 
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überlieferter Rechtsvorstellungen, wie sie dem hellenistisch gebildeten Römer selbst-
verständlich ist, und lokert dadurch den etwas zopfigen zünftlerischen Denkstil der 
vorklassischen Juristen (vergleichbar etwa dem englischen Inns) stark auf. Dagegen 
glaube ich, dass das innere Gefüge der klassischen Jurisprudenz sich diesen Ein-
wirkungen fast gänzlich versagte und den altrömischen Stil bis zu Julians Ediktredak-
tionen wahrte.’
9 Wieacker to Carl Schmitt, 13 July 1935, Nachlass Carl Schmitt, RW 265–17971/2, 
Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg: ‘Sachverhalts, die in der Rechtswelt 
eine reale eigenständige Existenz haben.’
10 Wieacker 1939: 449. ‘Denn ein Präjudiz kann nur angewendet werden, wenn man 
den gemeinsamen Grundgedanken, das tertium comparationis erkennt. Dieser 
Grundgedanke kann mit unbewusster Anschauung angewendet, aber auch aus-
drücklich als Regel formuliert und überliefert werden. Solche Regeln sind noch 
keine abstrakten Obersätze, sondern durch Anschauung und Erfahrung gewonnene 
Richtschnuren künftiger Praxis: wie Sprichwort, Wetterregel oder Rezept, zusam-
mengedrängte Weisheit von Generation. Mit dem Auftreten dieser Regularjurispru-
denz im 2.Jahrhundert beginnt das Rechtswissen um seiner selbst willen [.]’
11 Wieacker 1939: 447. ‘Dem freien Dienst am Gemeinwesen, der durch Gutachtung und 
Unterweisung geübt wird, und dessen strengste Gewähr die überwiegende Unent-
geltlichkeit ist. Eben dies dies unterscheidet den honos vom Erwerb auch höherer Art, 
besonders auch vom gebildeten, aber rechtskundigen Prozessredner, auf den er mit 
der stillen Geringschätzung des wirklich Sachkundigen herabblickt.’
12 Wieacker’s letter to Schmitt, 25 August 1942, Nachlass Carl Schmitt RW 265–17971/5, 
Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg: ‘Freilich fragt man sich, ob in jenem 
deutschen systematisch-philosophischen Typ die Durchdringung des Richteramts mit 
der Funktion, welche die politische Grundordnung dem Juristen zuweist, nicht bisher 
misslungen ist, und zwar eben wegen jener Gelehrt-systemalischen Betrachtung. 
Zuzugeben ist, dass die systematisch-normative Betrachtung des Lebens im Guten 
wie im Bösen auch für das Leben und Handeln, auch das politische Handeln der 
Deutschen bezeichnend ist.’
13 Wieacker to Schmitt, 25 August 1942, Nachlass Carl Schmitt RW 265–17971/5, 
Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg.
14 In ‘Das römische Recht und das deutsche Rechtsbewusstsein’ Wieacker describes 
Rechtsgewissen also as ‘geistige technik’ and ‘Geistige Macht der Wissenschaft’.
15 Like Wieacker’s, Hans Welzel’s post-war works were grounded on the earlier texts and 
philosophical openings. See Loos 2004: 1118.
16 Wieacker to Hans-Georg Gadamer, 14 March 1945. Nachlass Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Deutsches Literatur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar: ‘So abscheulich der öffentliche 
Zustand des Landes ist, dieser Mensch, ohne Gemüt, ohne Gewissen und Schicksal im 
Guten und im Bösen, ohne Humor im eigentlichen Sinne und ohne Sentimentalität, 
ohne das Bedürfnis, hinter seiner Wirklichkeit eine neue, nur der Einzelseele sichtbare 
transzendierende Wirklichkeit zu sehen, – dieser Mensch ist sonderbarerweise ein 
tröstliches und erheiterndes Bild, und und auch im Täglichen sympathisch. Wie das 
Urteil “ohne Gewissen hier” zu verstehen ist, muss ich doch wohl ausdrücken: statt 
des Gemüts die helle Heiterkeit, statt der Verantwortung die Absolution, statt des 
Gewissens das Gesetz, statt des Schicksals die Gnade.’
17 Gadamer 1986a: 107–10.
18 In this dilemma he was not alone. The coup of National Socialism and their distorted 
fashion of interpreting and adjusting the legal system was a memory and a fact that 
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led legal historians such as Helmut Coing or Gustav Radbuch to rethink and re-evalu-
ate the basis of the German legal system. See Coing 1950; Radbruch 1946.
19 Wieacker to Hans-Georg Gadamer, 14 July 1965. Nachlass Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Deutsches Literatur Archiv: ‘Den alten römischen Texten (für die dogmatische Aus-
legung) mit zunehmenden Zeitenabstand wirklich ein neurer, gerechterer Sinn sich 
entfalten kann; (wie im Abstand Hochgipfel hinter den vorgrelagerten Hügelketten 
aufsteigen).’
20 Wieacker to Gadamer, 14 July 1965. Nachlass Hans-Georg Gadamer, Deutsches Lit-
eratur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar: ‘diese könnte zusammenhängen mit der allgemein 
akzeptierten Diskreditierung und “Entlarvung” des Gesetzespositivismus. Diese 
Dinge sind heute so in Unordnung, dass die alten Grundverhältnisse von Gesetz und 
Dogmatik heute nur in Trübung erscheinen.’
21 Wieacker to Gadamer, 14 July 1965. Nachlass Hans-Georg Gadamer, Deutsches Lit-
eratur Archiv, Marbach am Neckar: ‘… für die modernen Gesetze scheint der heutige 
Jurist eine solche Erfahrung nicht zu machen. Ich wüsste für diese sehr eigentümliche 
Erscheinung im Augenblick keinen anderen Grund anzugeben als die besondere Res-
pektlosigkeit der heute herrschenden Auslegungslehren (Interessen – oder Wertung-
sjurisprudenz; teleologische, selbst “verfassungskonforme” Auslegung) gegen die im 
Gesetzeswort erscheinende Autorität.’
22 Franz Wieacker to Carl Schmitt, 16 May 1943, Nachlass Carl Schmitt RW 265–
17971/6, Landesarchiv Nordrhein-Westfalen, Duisburg: ‘Was ich im “Römischen 
Juristen” über die eigentümliche Rechtsontologie der Römer sage, nicht hinaus 
gehen, also keineswegs zugeben, dass die autonome, lebensheilige Geltung der 
überlieferterten und fachlich fortgebildeten Rechtsform in Altrom in die Bewusst-
seins-Kategorien des Magischen, Numinösen, des Tabu, Orenda und ähnlicher 
ethnologischer Hilfsvorstellungen fällt.’
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